Tnh 1 4 04 04

The conclusion drawn from them is also utterly satis- factory. When different impressions of the same sense come from an object, it certainly can’t be that each of these impressions resembles a quality that exists in the object. (Why? Because one object can’t, at one time have different qualities of the same sense, and one quality can’t resemble impressions that are entirely different from one another.) It evidently follows that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype [= ‘thing from which something is copied’]. Now, from similar effects we presume similar causes. Many of our impressions of colour, sound, etc., are admit- tedly nothing but internal existences ·with no archetypes in Nature·, arising from causes that don’t resemble them in the slightest. These impressions are in appearance in no way different from the other impressions of colour, sound, etc. So we conclude that they all have causes of that sort.

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