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The natural consequence of this reasoning should be that our perceptions don’t have a continued existence either; and indeed philosophers have reached this view so thoroughly that they change their system, and distinguish (as I shall do from here on) between •perceptions and •objects. They hold that perceptions are interrupted and perishing, and different at every different return ·to our senses·; and that objects are uninterrupted and preserve a continued existence and identity. But however philosophical this new system may be thought to be, I contend that it is only a superficial remedy, and that it contains all the difficulties of the common system along with some others that are all its own. There are no drives in either the understanding or the imagination that lead us directly to embrace this opinion of the double existence of •perceptions and •objects, and we can’t arrive at it except by passing through the common hypothesis of the identity and continuity of our interrupted •perceptions. If we weren’t first convinced that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they no longer appear to the senses, we would never be led to think that our perceptions and our objects are different, and that it is only our objects that have a continued existence. ·I contend·:
The philosophical hypothesis •has no primary recommendation either to reason or the imagination, and •acquires all its influence on the imagination from the common hypothesis.
This ·displayed· proposition contains two parts, which I shall try to prove as distinctly and clearly as such abstruse subjects will permit.

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