Tnh 1 4 02 33

The people who have this opinion about the identity of our resembling perceptions are in general all the uthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all of us at one time or another); so they are the ones who (·as I said earlier·) suppose their perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of a double existence: ·perception and external object·, internal and external, representing and represented. The very image that is present to the senses is for them (for us!) the real body, and it is to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity. But the interruption of the appearance seems contrary to their identity, and that naturally leads us to regard the resembling perceptions as different from each other ·after all·. Here we find ourselves at a loss how to reconcile such opposite opinions.
•The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. •The interrupted manner of their appearance makes us consider them as a number of distinct though similar things that appear after certain intervals.
The perplexity arising from this contradiction inclines us to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continued existence, which is the third part of the system I offered to explain.

Si no se indica lo contrario, el contenido de esta página se ofrece bajo Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 License.