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It has commonly been supposed that we attribute a reality and continued existence to some impressions because they are involuntary (·as I look up from this table with my eyes open I can’t help seeing the window, whereas with my eyes closed I can choose whether to imagine the window·); and another suggestion is that we attribute a reality and continued existence to some perceptions because they have greater force and violence than the others (·my perception when I see the window is more forceful than the one I have when I imagine the window·). These are both wrong. It is obvious that some impressions that we never suppose to have any existence beyond our perception are just as involuntary as, and are more violent than, the impressions of shape and extension, colour and sound that we suppose to be permanent beings; for example our pains and pleasures, our passions and affections… .

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