Now, let any philosopher try to explain the act of the mind we call ‘belief’, giving an account of its causes without bringing in the influence of custom on the imagination, and let his hypothesis be equally applicable to beasts as to the human species; when he has done this, I promise to accept the result! But at the same time I demand that if my system is the only one that can do this, it should in fairness be accepted as entirely satisfactory and convincing. That it is the only one is evident almost without any reasoning.
•Beasts certainly never perceive any real connection among objects. So
•it is by experience that they infer one from another. •They can’t by any argument reach the general conclu-
sion that objects of which they have had no experience
resemble those of which they have. So •it is through custom alone that experience operates
on them.
All this was obvious enough with respect to man. When applied to beasts there can’t be the least suspicion of mistake; which must be admitted to be a strong confirmation, or rather an invincible proof, of my system.

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