When an object is presented to us, it immediately gives the mind a lively idea of the object that is usually found to accompany it, and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connection of these objects. But when we step back and attend not to •the objects but to •our perceptions of them, we still have a causal claim to consider, namely that the impression (of one object) is the cause and the lively idea (of another object) is the effect; and their necessary connection is the new determination that we feel to pass from the idea of the impression to the idea of the lively idea. The force that unites our internal perceptions is as unintelligible—·as incapable of being seen as necessitating, just by hard thinking·—as is the force that unites external objects, and is known to us only by experience. Now, I have already sufficiently examined and explained the nature and effects of experience: it never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating force of objects, but only accustoms the mind to pass from ·an impression of· one to ·a lively idea of· another.

Si no se indica lo contrario, el contenido de esta página se ofrece bajo Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.5 License.