In order to clear up this difficulty, consider the following case:
Someone takes a die that has a circle on four of its sides and a square on the other two; he puts this die into a box, intending to throw it.
Obviously, he must consider a circle to be more probable than a square; that a circle will fall uppermost is the prediction that he must prefer. In a way he believes that a circle will come uppermost, but with hesitation and doubt in proportion to the number of chances of a square; and if the number of ‘square’ chances were lessened, thus increasing the gap between it and the number of ‘circle’ chances, his belief would become less hesitant and more confident. This belief arises from his mind’s operations on the simple and limited object before us, so we ought to be able to discover and explain it. We have nothing but one single die to think about, in order to grasp one of the most curious operations of the understanding. [By ‘curious’ Hume probably means something like ‘intricate and challenging’.] We should attend to three facts about the die that I have described. •First, certain causes—gravity, solidity, cubic shape, etc.—will cause it to fall, remain unaltered during the fall, and come down with one side uppermost. •Secondly, it has a particular number of sides, which are supposed indifferent—·that is, which are supposed to be such that there is no reason to expect any one rather than other to fall uppermost·. •Thirdly, on each side a certain figure is inscribed. These three facts constitute the whole nature of the die, so far as we are concerned here, and so they are the only things the mind can go by when forming a judgment about how the die will fall. So let us consider slowly and carefully what influence these facts must be having on our thought and imagination.

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