TNH 1.3.09.03

That is the objection; now let us consider its solution. It is obvious that whatever is present to the memory, striking on the mind with a liveliness that resembles ·that of· an immediate impression, must have a considerable effect on all the operations of the mind, easily distinguishing itself from mere fictions of the imagination. Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, incorporating into it whatever we remember having been present to our internal perception or ·our external· senses; and whenever some particular item in that system is joined to a present impressions, we choose to call it ‘a reality’. But the mind doesn’t stop at that. Finding that •this system of perceptions is connected by custom—or, if you like, by the relation of cause and effect—with •another system, it proceeds to consider the ideas of items in the latter system. It feels itself to be somehow forced to view these particular ideas, and finds that the custom or relation which does the forcing can’t be changed in the slightest; so it forms them—·this second set of ideas·—into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of ‘realities’. •The former of these two systems is the object of the memory and senses, the •latter of the judgment.

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