TNH 1.3.09.02

I have often remarked that in addition to •cause and effect the two relations of •resemblance and •contiguity are associating forces of thought, capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. I have also noted that when two objects are linked by either of these relations, and one of the objects is immediately present to the memory or senses, the mind is not only •carried to the linked object by means of the associating force, but •conceives that object with an additional force and vigour through the combined operation of the associating force and the present impression. In pointing all this out I was confirming by analogy my account of our judgments about cause and effect. But this very argument might be turned against me, becoming an objection to my hypothesis rather than a confirmation of it. The objection goes like this:
If all the parts of your hypothesis are true, namely: •these three kinds of relation are derived from the same principlesc, •their effects in giving force and liveliness to our ideas are the same, and •belief is nothing but a more forceful and vivacious conception of an idea, it should follow that belief can come not only from the relation of •cause and effect, but also from those of •contiguity and •resemblance. But we find by experience that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another unless they are connected by this relation. So we can conclude that there is some error in the reasoning that has led us into such difficulties.

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