TNH 1.3.06.03

Thus, in moving on through our topic we have suddenly come upon a new relation between cause and effect—finding this when we least expected it and were entirely employed on another subject. This relation is the constant conjunction of cause with effect. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us regard two objects as cause and effect unless we see that these two relations are preserved in a number of instances. Now we can see the advantage of leaving the direct survey of the cause-effect relation in order to discover the nature of the necessary connection that is such an essential part of it. Perhaps by this means we may at last arrive at our goal! But, to tell the truth, this newly discovered relation of constant conjunction doesn’t seem to take us far along our way. ·Here is an expansion of that pessimistic thought·:

The fact of constant conjunction implies only that similar objects have always been placed in similar relations of contiguity and succession; and it seems evident that this can’t reveal any new idea; it can make our ideas more numerous, but can’t make them richer. What we don’t learn from one object we can’t learn from a hundred that are all of the same kind and are perfectly alike in every detail. Our senses show us in one instance two bodies (or motions or qualities) in certain relations of succession and contiguity, and our memory presents us with a multitude of cases where we have found similar bodies (or motions or qualities) related in the same ways. The mere repetition of a past impression—even to infinity—won’t give rise any new original idea such as that of a necessary connection; and the sheer number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only.

But although this reasoning seems sound and obvious, it would be folly for us to despair too soon. So I shall continue the thread of my discourse: having found that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects we always draw an inference from one object to another, I shall now examine the nature of that inference, and of the transition from the impression to the idea. Perhaps we shall eventually find that •the necessary connection depends on the inference rather than •the inference’s depending on the necessary connection! It appears that the transition from an impression that is present to the memory or senses (and said to be of a ‘cause’) to the idea of an object (which is said to be an ‘effect’) is founded on past experience, and on our memory of their constant conjunction. So the next question is: how does experience produce the idea ·of the effect·? Is it done by the •understanding or by the •imagination? Are we caused to make the transition by •our reason or by •some ·nonreasoned· association and relation of perceptions? ·I shall start with the former suggestion, giving it about a couple of pages·.

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