TNH 1.1.01.05

So I perceive that although there is in general a great resemblance between our •complex impressions and ideas, it is not true across the board that they are exact copies of each other. Now let us consider how the case stands with our •simple perceptions. After the most accurate examination I am capable of, I venture to say that here the rule holds without exception: that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it, and every simple impression has a corresponding idea. The idea of red that we form in the dark differs only in •degree ·of intensity·, not in •nature, from the impression ·of red· that strikes our eyes in sun- shine. You can satisfy yourself that I am right abo­ut this by going over as many of your simple impressions and ideas as you like; it’s impossible to prove my point by going over all of them! But if anyone should deny this universal resemblance ·between simple impressions and simple ideas·, I don’t know how to convince him except by asking him to show •a simple impression that doesn’t have a corresponding idea, or •a simple idea that has no corresponding impression. If he doesn’t answer this challenge—and it’s certain that he can’t—then his silence and our own observation will suffice to establish our conclusion.

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